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Many large organisations now have a Chief Information Security Officer (CISO3). 
While it may seem obvious that their role is to define and deliver organisational 
security goals, there has been little discussion on what makes a CISO able to deliver 
this effectively.  In this paper, we report the results from 5 in-depth interviews with 
CISOs, which were analysed using organisational behaviour theory. The results show 
that the CISOs struggle to gain credibility within their organisation due to: a 
perceived lack of power, confusion about their role identity, and their inability to 
engage effectively with employees.  We conclude that as the CISO role continues to 
develop CISOs need to reflect on effective ways of achieving credibility in their 
organisations and, in particular, to work on communicating with employees and 
engaging them in security initiatives. We also identify a key responsibility for 
effective CISOs that is to remove the blockages that prevent information security 
from becoming ‘business as usual’ rather than a specialist function. For researchers, 
our findings offer a new piece of the emerging picture of human factors in 
information security initiatives.   
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 1 Introduction 
 
Information security aims and objectives need to be aligned with formal business 
processes as well as organisational culture (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001).  As a result 
of standards such as ISO 27001 information security is often incorporated into 
business processes, however, it is a more complex problem to align information 
security with organisational culture.  Organisational culture comes into being in the 
gaps within and between formal business processes and takes the shape of employee 
values, beliefs and assumptions (Schein, 2004) about what are acceptable short cuts, 
workarounds or informal ways of working in the organisation.   
 
CISOs have traditionally taken an authoritarian stance when trying to realise 
information security aims (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001).  This approach can work 
well in organisational hierarchies (particularly in the armed forces and the police) but 
we are seeing an increase in flatter and more open organisational structures that are at 
odds with this approach.  In recent years end users have been recognised as the 
weakest link in the security chain and this has led to significant changes in the role of 
the CISO.  
 
To a large extent, protecting information depends on change management, in 
particular persuading employees of the need to behave securely. This, in turn, depends 
on how the need for change is communicated and received by employees who are on 
the front line of information security.  As a result many CISOs are now expected to 
develop an organisational culture that supports information security by implementing 
successful security awareness programmes.  These relatively new aspects of the role 
require CISOs to be successful change agents.  To do this they need to be able to 
reflect on, and understand, the impact of their role on organisational culture. 
 
There has been little information security research that helps us to understand the 
impact of the CISO on organisational change.  Research in the field of management 
studies, however, has identified key resources that need to be available to a change 
agent in order for them to be successful.  These resources include: expertise, 
credibility (this includes stature and prestige in the organisation), political access to 
senior management and control of rewards and sanctions (Hardy, 1996). 
 
While successful CISOs will seek to understand the attitudes of end users towards 
information security there is little evidence that they reflect on their own attitudes and 
behaviours and how these contribute to the success or failure of change initiatives.  
The purpose of this research therefore is to start this reflective process and to reveal 
the strengths and weaknesses of CISOs in building a culture of information security.  
In this study we aim to understand whether the CISO is likely to be an effective 
change agent for organisational culture.  
 
The research comprised five in-depth interviews in a range of organisations and 
included both the public and private sector.  The interviewees were senior managers 
responsible for ensuring the security of information within their respective 
organisations.  The interviews were semi-structured around a map of topics related to 
information security awareness and communication.  The methodological approach 
was qualitative and analysed the discourse of the interviewees.  The theoretical 
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 framework used for the analysis was a model developed within organisational 
behaviour research to understand the role of discourse in changing organisational 
culture.  
 
The substantive aim of the research was to understand CISOs’ perceptions and 
attitudes that would impact on their ability to change behaviour within the culture of 
their organisations.  The methodological aim was to assess whether a qualitative, 
discourse analytic approach would yield an understanding of CISOs’ perceptions and 
attitudes and to test a validated approach from organisational behaviour by applying it 
to information security. 
 
This paper starts with a brief review of related work in the field of information 
security and defines the contribution that organisational behaviour makes to the 
effective delivery of information security messages.  The research method is 
described along with the analytical approaches used to interpret and frame the results.  
The results of the research follow, together with a discussion of the results.  Finally 
the paper concludes by outlining the implications of the research and the contributions 
made. 
 
 
2 Background and Related Work 
 
Information security researchers have recognised the importance of addressing the 
informal processes within organisations that often undermine the documented and 
approved formal processes. Such informal processes are largely determined by the 
organisational culture. A small number of researchers have repeatedly suggested that 
there is a need to achieve a better understanding of the social aspects of the 
organisation; in particular the human element (Dhillon 1995; Dhillon & Backhouse 
2001).  While this has been explored at a conceptual and theoretical level (Thomson 
& Von Solms, 2005; Siponen, 2001) there are very few empirical studies (Adams & 
Sasse, 1999; Albrechtson, 2007). 
 
Conceptual studies have used theories from psychology and marketing to build 
models and frameworks and develop guidelines for the design and implementation of 
security awareness programmes (Siponen, 2000 and 2001).  Research has also been 
carried out examining information security behaviours, attitudes and organisational 
culture conceptually (Thomson & von Solms, 2005; Helokunnas & Kuuisisto, 2003) 
but there has been no empirical research that focuses on the role of the CISO as a 
change agent.  Albrechtson’s (2007) research, however, showed that CISOs tend to 
use a one-way model of communication with end users – pushing information out but 
not listening to what is communicated back or exploring how their messages are 
received.  
 
The failure of a one-way model of communication has been highlighted in other fields 
by Wertsch (2001) who criticises the unidirectionality of the flow of communication 
in Reddy’s Transmission Model of Communication in which the receiver is passive 
and there is no feedback loop between the sender and receiver. Albrechtson’s (2007) 
research suggests that users want a ‘user-involving approach’ to security awareness 
and that, ‘Mass-media based awareness campaigns, have, according to the 
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 interviewed users, no significant long-term effects on users’ behaviour and 
awareness’ (p.286). As Adams and Sasse (1999) point out, insufficient 
communication with employees, ‘causes them to construct their own model of 
possible security threats and the importance of security and these are often wildly 
inaccurate’ (p.43). From this we can perhaps conclude that it is communication of the 
right type that is most important. 
 
Our research uses discourse analytic techniques to examine the ways that CISOs 
communicate information security requirements. This approach has its roots in social 
psychology, and is increasingly being valued in organisational studies as a way to get 
beneath the formal structures in an organisation and to understand the importance of 
the underlying social dynamics.  Discourse analysis is the term given to a range of 
analytical techniques that explore language in use in specific contexts.  It differs from 
content analysis in its attention to the role of context in the way language is used.  
This turn to language has been a feature of organisational research in recent years 
(Oswick et al, 2000; Alvesson & Karreman, 2000; Hardy, 2001; Grant et al, 2005) 
and has been used, albeit infrequently, in information systems research (Heracleous & 
Barrett, 2001). 
 
The key characteristics of discourse analysis are that it is anti-realist and constructivist 
(Bryman, 2001).  Anti-realism is the belief that there is no external reality waiting to 
be discovered by the researcher because reality comes into being through the use of 
language.  Discourse analysis is constructivist in a number of ways.  Firstly, language 
constructs and reproduces versions of the social world (Saunders et al, 2007) 
according to how it is used, who by and in what context.  Discourse analysis examines 
how this occurs.  Secondly, it is constructivist in the very real sense that discourse is 
built out of language that already exists (Saunders et al, 2007) and is available to us.  
Discourse requires active selection and a choice has to be made about which words to 
use.  Thirdly, as Potter & Wetherell (1987) point out, discourse builds a version of 
social reality and therefore has a real impact even though this may not be done 
consciously.  Discourse analysis tends to explore the use of interpretive repertoires.  
These are the shared meanings and conceptualisations that are embedded in culture 
(Marshall, 1994) that are used as the building blocks of discourse.  
 
As Marshall (1994) acknowledges, however, because of the importance of context the 
data that is collected will be affected by the interview setting itself, the context in 
which it is carried out and the relationship between interviewer and interviewee.  The 
data that is analysed is not seen as a transparent revealing of attitudes but as an 
exploration of the way that attitudes come into being through sense-making (Marshall, 
1994).  As Dick (2004) suggests the analysis seeks explanations not generalizations.   
 
By starting from the point of a social and organisational problem, our analysis uses a 
model developed by Hardy et al (2000) for examining organisational discourse as a 
strategic resource. Hardy points out that, ‘discursive studies are playing a major role 
in the study of organisations and in shaping some of the key debates that frame 
organisation and management theory’ (p.25). There is a growing amount of support 
for this way of examining change management and organisational behaviour. 
Alvesson & Karreman state that, ‘it seems that language (and language use) is 
increasingly being understood as the most important phenomenon, accessible for 
empirical investigation, in social and organisational research’ (p. 1126). Oswick et al 
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 assert that discourse within organisations can help to explain, ‘processes of organizing 
and the behaviour or organisational stakeholders’ (p.1116). Finally, Grant et al 
suggests that discourse analysis can contribute to an understanding of organisational 
change in five different ways: as ‘socially constructed reality’, as ‘negotiated 
meaning’, as an ‘intertextual phenomenon’, from a ‘multi- disciplinary perspective’ 
and as an ‘alternative approach’ to other ways of studying organisational change (p.9). 
Tsoukas (2005) in particular highlights the model developed by Hardy et al (2000) 
used in this research and makes a case for why a discourse analytic approach offers 
greater potential for achieving organisational change than traditional behaviorist and 
cognitivist approaches. 
 
3 Data Collection and Analysis 
 
The research focused on the discourse surrounding security awareness programmes.  
Security awareness programmes are often the primary way that CISOs implement 
cultural change for information security.  The interviews captured the language used 
by CISOs and the focus on security awareness programmes allowed an exploration of 
the main communication channel between CISOs and end users.    
3.1  Data Collection in Participating Organisations 
Five organisations agreed to participate in the research.  The criteria for approaching 
organisations were that they should form a diverse group and cover a range of 
industry sectors, and they should be able to demonstrate that they implemented 
current best practice in information security processes.  Evidence of best practice was 
drawn by selecting participants from organisations that had implemented standards 
such as ISO/IEC 27001 (the International Standard for Information Security) and who 
were individual members of professional bodies such as the IISP (Institute of 
Information Security Professionals), the BCS (British Computer Society) or the IET 
(Institution of Electronics & Technology).   
 
Each company was of a similar size and organisational structure and operated 
globally.  The only exception to this was the public sector organisation but it was 
believed important to include representation from this sector, and whilst the 
interviewee did not represent a large, global organisation the scale of concerns was 
felt to be broadly comparable in that this department has responsibility for protecting 
the UK as a nation state.  Individual interviewees all operate at the level of CISO 
within global organisations, or at the level of national security. The organisations 
represented covered a range of sectors (oil, banking, insurance, media and 
government). Due to the high profile of the organisations involved, interviewees’ 
contributions are anonymised. 
 
The primary method for collecting data for discourse analysis is through the semi-
structured interview, often from relatively small samples.  This is acceptable in 
qualitative research because the richness of the data that is gathered will often reveal a 
large range of interpretive repertoires from a small number of interviews.  There is 
also the more practical reason that discourse analysis requires the transcription of 
interviews and is, therefore, resource intensive both to transcribe and analyse.   
 
There is an important distinction to be made here between sampling and case studies.  
Our intention was not to interview a representative sample but to look at rare cases.  
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 There are relatively few CISOs and even fewer operating using these best practice 
guidelines in such an emergent field.  Furthermore CISOs are generally reluctant to 
talk about their work because it involves the security of their organisations.  We 
wanted to examine CISOs who were working at the forefront of their profession and 
this set of criteria necessarily led to a small number of cases.  The interviews were 
conducted face to face on the premises of the participating organisations.  Crouch and 
McKenzie (2006) make a strong case for this approach and cite others (Dreher, 1994) 
who argue that in inductive research carried out in real world settings small numbers 
of interviews can enhance the quality of the research outcomes.  The value of the 
research comes from the explanations provided and from the concepts generated 
rather than from generalisation.  
 
The research data consisted of transcripts of interviews with the CISOs.  The 
interviews were semi-structured using a mind map of topics and giving interviewees 
control over what they chose to focus on.  The questions asked during the semi-
structured interview focused on the perception that the CISO has surrounding security 
awareness in their organisation, the steps that being taken to promulgate security 
awareness and how successful they believe their approach to security awareness has 
been.  Each of the interviews was recorded using a digital voice recorder.  The audio 
files were then transferred to a computer and transcribed manually by the researcher 
using standard audio dictation software.  The transcribed data was used as the basis 
used for analysis.  
 
3.2 Analytical Framework 
The analysis used a framework developed by Hardy et al (2000) for examining the 
impact of discourse on the success or failure of organisational change programmes.  
The model defines three circuits of discourse.  The circuit of activity is where 
individuals communicate new messages – in this case the individual is the CISO.   
Often there is an attempt to link these new messages with concepts that have already 
been accepted in order to achieve legitimacy.  Secondly, there is the circuit of 
performativity where these new messages are tried out and either taken up and used in 
the organisation or rejected.  This will depend on both the perceived legitimacy of the 
message and of the speaker.  Thirdly, there is the circuit of connectivity where the 
new message and ideas become embedded in the organisational culture to the extent 
that they become the new concepts by which others are defined.  At this point the 
organisational culture within the organisation will have changed. 
 
This framework made it possible to examine the discourse of the CISOs interviewed 
and to identify how they developed new messages and where they were claiming 
associations with other messages.  The next step was to locate these messages in the 
context of organisational culture to ascertain whether CISOs believed these new 
messages achieved legitimacy with end users. The final step was to examine whether 
there was evidence that the messages had become embedded.   
 
The coding was non-quantitative and phenomenological in approach.  The process 
started with open coding before moving to thematic coding. After open coding the 
following themes were identified: 
 
a)  Position of the information security function in the organisational structure 
b) Identity of CISOs within the organisation 
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 c)  Perceived problems of achieving awareness of information security 
d)  Approaches to information security 
e)  Communication with the end user 
f)  Identity of the end user  
g)  Contradictions in what was said 
h)  Categories of language used (business, marketing, community) 
i)  Perceived culture of the organisation 
 
Comments from each interviewee were then coded under these themes. Selected 
comments focused on different levels of analysis such as the overall content of what 
was said, the structure of the comments made and the vocabulary that was used. 
 
4 Results and Discussion 
 
4.1 Circuit of Activity  
The research found that CISOs made a range of discursive statements that aimed to 
form associations between information security and other aspects of the organisation, 
such as business strategy, compliance with regulatory requirements and the marketing 
function. CISOs linked themselves and the field of information security with these 
more traditional and well established organisational concepts. The success of the 
circuit of activity, however, depends on communicating these new discursive 
statements in a way that causes them to ‘take’ in the organisation.  The associations 
that were identified are discussed in turn. 
 
4.1.1 Business Strategy and Compliance  
Of the various discourses that were used by interviewees, that of business strategy and 
compliance was used most frequently to frame the message of information security. 
These messages focused on the idea of a successful organisation being one that 
adopted sound business processes and that achieves compliance with legal and 
regulatory requirements. By framing information security in this way, the CISO is 
positioned as an individual who is advocating a structured, process-based approach.  
 
An example of this can be seen when Interviewee A talked about the need for, 
‘agendas and objectives’ for information security awareness and although he 
expressed misgivings about following standards such as ISO 27001 he commented 
that:  
…the auditors expect it … and in trying to get security as a business as 
usual activity rather than as an additional process it’s quite fundamental.  
 
As a result of legal and regulatory requirements compliance is a driver for security 
awareness and, in this case, the need to prove compliance resulted in the requirement 
for quantitative metrics and statistics.  For one interviewee this was one of the main 
reasons for on-line tests for security awareness and was driven by a need to prove the 
value of information security to the business and to provide evidence for auditors and 
regulators. In the case of Interviewee A it seems that compliance offers a way for 
information security to gain credibility within the organisation even though there is 
some concern over the benefits delivered. Interviewee B echoes this association 
between information security and compliance when talking of the experience of 
employees in other geographical locations and says:  
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 There’s quite a strong security awareness programme in the States, and 
that’s partly driven by the regulator but also that’s part of their culture  
 
In this comment, Interviewee B reveals that there are differences in how information 
security is accepted across the organisation, with employees in the USA being more 
amenable to the framing of information security as a regulatory issue. There is still an 
association made between information security and compliance, but this association 
has become embedded in organisational culture in a way that Interviewee B has not 
experienced in the UK.  
 
Even when interviewees did not explicitly use the discourse of business, they were 
keen to mimic other business activities. So, for example, Interviewee B talked about 
copying advertisements used to promote the organisation externally but changing 
them slightly to make them specific to internal information security issues. The 
comment made was that this is necessary because, ‘everyone is focused on doing the 
business’.  The implication is that if information security is not seen to be focused on 
the business as well it becomes:  
 
…an extra, sort of running alongside… and we run the risk always as 
being seen as an impediment to doing business which is a huge issue.  
 
The idea of information security ‘running alongside’ the rest of the business is a 
phrase that strongly evokes the image of information security trying to catch up with 
the rest of the organisation.  The marginalisation of information security is further 
emphasised by the comment that CISOs are seen as an ‘impediment’.  
 
4.1.2 Marketing  
As we can see from the example above, other discursive framing devices included that 
of marketing. Interviewees B and E made reference to using marketing activities but 
without explicitly associating security awareness programmes with the language of 
marketing. Interviewee B had chosen to use the assistance of the marketing 
department to put together the security awareness campaign. When asked why this 
choice had been made rather than using the internal communications team the opinion 
was given that: 
 
This required something extra… This is a step further, this is actually 
working harder, if you see what I mean. To persuade people that there’s 
something here that they want, so for that reason I decided that we needed 
to go to the big outside guys …we’re also trying to link it though to make 
it seem properly integrated into the business.  
 
This again suggests an association is being made between information security 
awareness and ‘business as usual’ in the organisation. It also acknowledges that it is 
difficult to persuade employees to internalise the information security message and it 
needs to be sold to them.  Finally the fact that the interviewee says they want to make 
it ‘seem’ integrated with the business suggests that they do not really believe what 
they are saying themselves. The association with everyday business is perhaps an 
illusion that they aim to achieve.  
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 Interviewee A, however, did explicitly associate information security awareness with 
marketing, referring to the need to be ‘creative’ to create ‘stickiness’ for the 
awareness web site, choosing the right ‘delivery channels’ and using market 
‘segmentation’ to pitch the right message to the right audience.  The language of 
marketing is blended with that of business in order to bolster the claim for credibility 
for information security. Unfortunately when this is followed through it appears to 
have had limited success as there was still little understanding of whether, or how, the 
message was being received and internalised by the employees. Interviewee B spoke 
of ‘applying proper marketing principles’ and Interviewee A outlined how they 
decided to implement security awareness through different delivery channels: 
  
Well, ok, here are the different channels, here are the different ways of 
implementing it, here’s the different type of audience. So we looked at that 
and we also looked at cost effectiveness behind this as well to try and 
understand in a bit more detail where this stuff really works … and where 
you get the biggest bang for your buck.  
 
From this we can start to understand how the association with marketing goes some 
way to fulfilling the need for rigour and respectability that information security seeks. 
The muscular language of business is also employed in the phrase ‘biggest bang for 
your buck’ and this, together with reference to ‘cost effectiveness’ aims to situate 
information security and awareness programmes as a legitimate and important part of 
business operations. 
4.2 Circuit of Performativity  
The circuit of performativity is where we would expect to see new discursive 
statements become embedded in the wider context of the organisation.  This would 
demonstrate whether the circuit of activity is delivering the intended results.  As 
Hardy et al (2000) point out, this requires that the new statements have meaning in the 
organisation, that they resonate with other individuals and the ‘subject position of the 
enunciator must warrant voice’ (p.1236). By this they mean that there are some 
individuals within an organisation who have an informal mandate to speak and act 
while others are unheard and invisible. During the circuit of performativity we would 
expect the CISO to be visible and heard if their new discursive statements are going to 
have an effect. By understanding the subject positions of the CISO, we can start to 
explore how certain discourses become authoritative and, in effect, become the truth 
within the organisation. The two key elements that determine the subject position of 
the CISO are identity and power.  
 
4.2.1 CISOs’ Engagement with Employees  
It is difficult to see clearly how successful CISOs have been in associating these 
discursive statements of business, compliance and marketing with information 
security.  Even the participants (who work for organisations which have already been 
acknowledged as being at the forefront of information security practice) have no clear 
idea of whether their messages have caused employees to change their behaviour and 
attitudes towards information security.  
 
This can be at least partially attributed to the fact that CISOs largely used one-way 
communication with employees. This was evident from their lack of engagement with 
employees as individuals (as opposed to work roles), and their distance from the 
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 employee. There was a belief across all interviewees that the need to protect 
information assets was a ‘tough sell’ and that security was seen as an ‘extra add-on’ 
and an ‘impediment’ to fulfilling one’s job. It was not clear though where this belief 
had originated but it had become commonly accepted within the broader context of 
these organisations and CISOs had internalised this belief and accepted that their 
message was ‘not popular’.  
 
Only Interviewee E explicitly discussed engaging directly with employees and this 
was at the beginning of a security awareness initiative.  
 
We did a survey and we found that users were very confident that the 
network protected them from everything, extremely confident … we, of 
course, asked IT how well the network was protected and they all said, oh 
it’s dreadful it leaks like a sieve … we said the … network is semi-public, 
so you think things are guaranteed but they’re not.  
 
This interviewee pointed out that the corporate network could not be relied upon to 
keep information secure and for that reason, users needed to take some responsibility 
for helping to protect it.  Employees, however, did not have any idea of what their 
responsibilities might be for protecting the network. 
 
When assessing the circuit of activity, it appears that CISOs are borrowing discursive 
statements from other business functions and applying them to information security as 
part of a strategic move to gain credibility. Unfortunately it is difficult to see whether 
this is working because they have no way of measuring the effectiveness of their 
communications.  
 
4.2.2 Organisational Identity of the CISO  
An important consideration is whether CISOs have an identity within the organisation 
that warrants a voice in the wider organisational context. CISOs themselves allude to 
some of the identity issues that they face in their role. A number of interviewees 
suggested that they are seen as being remote and unconnected from employees; 
Interviewee A calls it an ‘ivory tower’ way of thinking. There is a perception within 
the organisation that they are too academic and impractical. The drive towards 
security awareness forces CISOs to communicate with employees, and yet often a 
further problem arises in that they can be too evangelical about their subject. 
Interviewee A used terms such as, ‘preaching’ and ‘enthusiast’ to describe how they 
aim to, ‘influence’, ‘educate’ and ‘train’ employees. Interviewee B recognised that 
they acted as a barrier to the way their message is received because, ‘We’re too close 
to the subject, it’s too important to us, it’s not important to anybody else’. 
This was echoed by Interviewee E who said:  
 
If you’re a security person you think that people should follow the book. 
People do not walk into the office though saying, I’m going to follow the 
security rule book today, it’s not the most exciting thing in their lives.  
 
CISOs demonstrate a degree of self-awareness in this acknowledgement that 
employees find it difficult to understand why they need to protect the organisation’s 
information and the accompanying realisation that CISOs need to address the way that 
they communicate their message.  
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This is where we start to see CISOs struggling with their identity. The CISO is on the 
one hand a specialist who has an authoritative role in protecting the employee and the 
organisation, on the other hand they seek to negotiate a transactional relationship with 
employees and to be accepted as part of the legitimate management structure of the 
organisation.  
 
These two identities cast the employee in a different role in relation to the CISO and 
have the potential to cause confusion in the relationship. Interviewee B talked about 
aiming to get ‘buy-in’ to security from employees and to develop ‘co-operation’. 
Interviewee B also gave an opinion of what could be achieved with a successful 
information security awareness programme:  
 
My guess is a lot of the problems will be solved because people’s common 
sense on the whole does rule and I think if you give people the right prods 
if you like then mostly people will do the right thing.  
 
There was mention of wanting to instil ‘confidence’ in employees and to aim for their 
‘empowerment’. We can see from these examples that with CISOs taking on this 
identity employees are treated as mature participants in the security awareness 
programme. This is strongly at odds, however, with how employees are positioned 
when CISOs take an authoritative stance. Interviewees wanted employees to follow 
the ‘principles’ that they laid down. Interviewee E gave employees security awareness 
toolkits to ‘play’ with, they were enticed to security awareness briefings by ‘pizza’ 
and ‘video games’ and given ‘little prompt things’ to take away. Interviewee E stated 
that:  
 
We had little Macromedia animations that showed a click and it sort of 
spread round the network and affected production and plants and stuff like 
this… And we used the traders as our target audience … and getting them 
away from trading is fairly key, but they like these and it then led into a 
game that they could play which had a very high take up because people 
enjoyed that.  
 
If CISOs are taking an authoritative role, then it seems that employees are positioned 
as the children in the relationship. Given that these two identities were expressed by 
all interviewees it is unsurprising that employees are unclear about what is expected 
of them – are they children who need protecting by CISOs (and who therefore cannot 
be blamed for the mistakes that they make) or are they equals in the relationship (and 
therefore sharing responsibility for protecting the organisation’s information assets)?  
 
4.2.3 Lack of Confidence  
It becomes clear from the interviews that - despite the realisation that organisational 
change needs to be addressed to deliver a culture of information security - this is not 
an area where the interviewees felt comfortable. Interviewees who were keen to see a 
more centralised approach to information security structures and strategies (the 
traditional ‘command and control’ approach) expressed their discomfort most strongly 
when they started to discuss the purpose of security awareness initiatives. Interviewee 
A acknowledged a feeling of certainty and a ‘lack of knowledge’ in this area which 
was ‘subjective’ and dependent on ‘interpretation’. Interviewees’ speech tended to 
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 become fragmented and words and phrases such as ‘hopefully’, ‘sort of’, ‘body 
language and the like’ expressed the change from being in command of the situation 
to being on uncertain ground. Interviewee D expressed discomfort in a similar way 
talking about the ‘umms’ and ‘aaahs’ of employees’ confusion over security 
awareness and by asking ‘is that the right word?’. Interviewee A also switched from 
using ‘I’ to ‘we’ – using this as a form of protection by distancing himself when 
discussing issues outside his sphere of knowledge. When asked how the effectiveness 
of awareness programmes was assessed Interviewee A said:  
 
… a mixture of things like, if you look at the outreach programme, if you 
think of it in terms of, well ok, how do we get there? … So for example, 
we can measure the hits on our web site to say ok, bang’  
 
In a similar way, Interviewee D expressed hesitation when talking about the aims of 
his organisation’s awareness programme:  
 
The aims of the security awareness programme … The aims – it’s to 
change culture, it’s to make people, culture’s a bit of a soft word isn’t it, 
it’s to make people, it’s to make us more secure’  
 
As speech became increasingly vague and the structure disjointed, some interviewees 
struggled to define what they meant when they talked about the behavioural issues of 
security awareness.  
 
The belief that there was a lack of substance behind many security awareness 
campaigns came through clearly. Interviewee A suggested the repetitiveness and 
emptiness of most security messages by referring to them as, ‘blah, blah, blah’ and 
‘fluff and circumstance’. Another interviewee acknowledged that many security 
messages are based on ‘smoke and mirrors’, thus linking information security with 
magicians and conjurers for whom success depends on trickery. Those interviewed 
were not including their own programmes within this critique. CISOs believe that the 
area of security awareness has moved on, but by repeatedly returning to past mistakes, 
they may be perpetuating the idea that security awareness programmes are a waste of 
time both for employees, for organisations and as part of the field of information 
security. It is unsurprising given this attitude that the need to prove the credibility of 
such programmes is so strong.  
 
When we consider the discursive statements made by CISOs against the criteria 
suggested in Hardy et al’s (2000) model of the circuit of performativity, it appears 
that CISOs do not have an identity that warrants their voice being listened to in the 
organisation. We can see this in the way that they perceive their own identity, the 
belief that they lack the necessary skills to communicate with employees effectively 
and the way that often the management of information security takes some of them 
into an area that is outside their scope of expertise. Overall, it seems that their 
conflicting views of their own identity positions them as the underdog in the 
organisation. When we consider why discursive statements made by CISOs do not 
resonate then it seems that this is both a result of their confused identity within the 
organisation but also the way that they do not expect to be taken seriously by the 
business. This is emphasised by their own lack of belief in many security awareness 
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 programmes and the contradiction inherent between the two identities they construct 
for the employee: that of mature adult or irresponsible child.  
4.3 Circuit of Connectivity  
The final part of Hardy et al’s (2000) model is the circuit of connectivity. This is 
realised if the circuit of activity and circuit of performativity overlap and it is here that 
the new discursive statements ‘take’, new connections are made, new subject 
positions emerge and the ‘accumulation of statements/practices influences future 
discourse’ (p.1235). It is at this point that that organisational change will be achieved. 
In information security achieving this will depend to a large extent on whether CISOs 
are seen as having a legitimate right to be listened to and whether employees trust 
them sufficiently to believe the discursive statements that they make and to act upon 
them.  
 
We have already seen in the circuit of performativity that legitimacy and trust are 
likely to be lacking in the way employees view CISOs. This can be attributed to the 
role identity of those responsible for information security and the way that their 
discursive statements fail to resonate. There are other obstacles though that inhibit the 
development of legitimacy and trust and contribute to the failure of discursive 
statements made by CISOs to take. Other elements of the organisation may have a 
vested interest in ensuring that discursive statements about information security are 
not integrated into the wider social and organisational context. On a positive note 
though it is clear that despite the identities they construct for employees, CISOs at 
some level trust the employee to protect the organisation’s information assets if the 
message is constructed using discursive statements that can successfully go through 
the circuits of performativity and connectivity. The last part of this section looks at 
emerging discursive statements that may be able to operate in this way.  
 
4.3.1 Measures of Effectiveness  
One obstacle that looms large throughout this research is the need to provide 
measures of effectiveness for security awareness programmes; that is some kind of 
proof that they actually work. Frequently this was the point at which interviewees 
relied on measuring what they could measure, often recognising, however, that this 
was inadequate, that they had ‘no evidence’ for measuring the human factors element 
of security awareness programmes and that what there was did not provide the proof 
they needed. Interviewee D said of their awareness programme:  
 
How has it been received by employees? Well, to be perfectly honest it’s 
hard to tell. I do get statistics on the usage of the site but it doesn’t mean 
that the message is sinking in … some folks seem to want that information 
… but frankly, if it was important I’d be looking at it more often than I do.  
 
By looking for quantitative measures such as ‘stats’, the number of hits on a web site 
or the results of on-line quizzes interviewees continued the search for respectability 
by trying to justify security awareness programmes in business language, often in 
terms of return on investment.  
 
This is the problem highlighted by Shultz (2004), who suggests that CISOs are not 
valued because they cannot easily produce a return on investment figure for the work 
that they do, particularly when it comes to security awareness. The identity of the 
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 CISO then is negatively determined by the need to frame what they do within the 
discourse of business. Most of the interviewees recognised that they needed to go 
about assessing the effectiveness of security awareness programmes differently. 
 
4.3.2 Hierarchy and Status Quo  
There is also a hierarchical obstacle that prevents new discursive statements from 
being taken up. There may be a section of the organisational hierarchy that is, in 
effect, acting as a blockage and these are often middle managers. Interviewee D 
admitted that middle managers were a section of the organisation that was not 
targeted, and yet Interviewee C pointed out that individuals at this level often do not 
feel able to admit to ignorance, particularly about a subject that is perceived as 
technical. Interviewee A linked the actions of senior managers with those of middle 
managers and discussed the impact of one on the other:  
 
They want to do the right thing at a senior management level. I think the 
challenge lies with the treacle of middle management. So senior 
management might say something but unless they do more than just speak 
about it, unless they put something in place that will enable middle 
management to follow through and not have a conflict of interest in terms 
of all the other agendas and objectives that they have.  
 
The phrase, ‘treacle of middle management’, is a particularly evocative way of 
describing the problems of persuading users at this level to change their behaviours 
and the reason given is the dominance of other ‘agendas and objectives’. This 
suggests that other discursive statements are still taking precedence and that 
information security is not being taken up at this level of the organisation.  
 
On reflection, it appears that the social order of the organisation may have an interest 
in ensuring that new discursive statements about information security do not become 
embedded. By putting in place an information security function senior managers 
satisfy the legal and regulatory requirements and effectively delegate (as far as they 
can) their responsibility to those who are specialists in this area. If it becomes widely 
accepted that information security needs to be addressed at a strategic level, then 
senior managers will be forced to take control of this area. From the perspective of 
security awareness senior managers are assisted in maintaining their current position 
if information security continues to be seen as a specialist, technical subject that is 
imposed from a different part of the organisation. Senior managers can then distance 
themselves from the practices and processes that are implemented.  This makes it 
easier for senior managers to make excuses for bypassing security practices by 
emphasising the importance of their business tasks over the importance of security 
and this has been evident in the discourse used.  
 
4.3.3 Corporate Social Responsibility  
There was, however, a general belief amongst interviewees that the employee would 
do the right thing and take care to protect information if they were aware of the issues. 
If the message could be conveyed in a way that was accepted then it was generally 
agreed that ‘common sense’ would prevail. It was felt that employees would make 
‘sensible’ decisions so that when a security incident was suspected they would act 
accordingly with only a minimal ‘push’ or ‘prod’ needed. Interviewee A expressed a 
desire to help the employee and `to ‘serve them up’ a message that would help them 
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 to think about, ‘…the wider issues, rather than simply the issues that they’re being 
tested on. So I think there will be a meeting of minds’.  In spite of their self-image, 
this stance offered hope that CISOs would aim to find a way to convey the message 
that offered the most benefit to the employee and the organisation as a whole.  
 
There does seem to be one other set of discursive statements emerging from CISOs. 
This was hinted at rather than explicitly described. These statements could be grouped 
as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Each interviewee made some use of this 
way of framing what they did with security awareness but it seemed to occur 
accidentally and was not employed self consciously or with any form of agency.  
 
Interviewee A referred to using the charity ChildNet to connect security awareness at 
home with security awareness in the organisation. The reasoning behind this was 
explained as follows:  
 
…let’s introduce it from the respect of your home life and then see 
whether you can get the message transferring into your work environment. 
So if they’re much more aware of these sorts of issues which have a lot of 
commonality between things…if you sort of deal with it as we have with 
ChildNet to say, ok think about it from your families’ perspective, think 
about it from your children’s perspective.  
 
The belief being that employees would engage more readily with being told how to 
protect their children on-line and that they would then transfer this knowledge and 
awareness into the workplace. Interviewee E was also building the organisation’s next 
security awareness campaign around this premise. As Interviewee C pointed out this 
was the premise behind the UK’s ‘Get Safe Online’ campaign. Interviewee B made 
reference to linking information security with protecting the home, the family and 
personal finances. Interviewee D took this a step further:  
 
…it isn’t really necessarily a set of security skills that are needed it’s a set 
of marketing skills. And there’s one guy who I think does this pretty well 
in our organisation but he also raises a lot of money for charity and he 
knows how to get behind people’s consciences and them to, you know, 
give money to charity.  
 
Although Interviewee D refers to marketing skills, the underlying skill that is 
identified is getting the message across is actually the ability to ‘get behind people’s 
consciences’ and connect with them meaningfully. There may be an association worth 
pursuing between conscience and the social life of employees beyond organisational 
boundaries and the need to protect information assets. This could be a new circuit of 
activity but needs to be tested with employees.  
 
It seems that the messages constructed by CISOs to deliver a culture of information 
security are failing to perform against the criteria for circuits of performativity and 
connectivity. This prevents information security awareness programmes from 
achieving the aim of cultural change within organisations. It does appear, however, 
that an alternative range of associations are being formed connecting information 
security with the community and social life beyond the organisation. This may 
facilitate the embedding of new discursive statements as employees are addressed as 
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 individuals rather than in their organisational roles. From this position it may be 
possible to move new discursive statements through the circuits of performativity and 
connectivity. 
5 Summary and Conclusions 
The diagram below summarises the three circuits of activity and themes within them.  
In the circuit of activity the language of business strategy and compliance was used as 
well as marketing to link information security with more established organisational 
functions.  In the circuit of performativity, however, it became clear that discursive 
statements from the CISO were not taking because of their mechanisms for 
engagement with end users.  This was coupled with their own identity within the 
organisation and was exacerbated by their lack of confidence in what they were doing.  
In the circuit of connectivity we saw that that cultural change was unlikely to be 
achieved because there were no measures of effectiveness for the messages that 
CISOs were transmitting.  There were also blockages in the form of existing 
organisational hierarchies.  The only discursive activity that occurred that seemed to 
have the potential for developing a culture of information security was around 
corporate social responsibility.   
 
 
 
Diagram adapted from Hardy et al (2000) 
 
Overall findings suggest that CISOs currently are not constructing the right messages 
to deliver cultural change for information security. CISOs need to take a more 
participative approach if they are to be effective. This will require genuine two-way 
communication with employees, negotiation and involvement to overcome the often 
observed ‘them’ and ‘us’ relationship, and an acceptance that mistakes and errors will 
occur. The necessity for achieving this new identity is implicit in the discourse that 
this research has presented; as are some of the difficulties and contradictions in 
achieving this.  
 
For CISOs the difficulties of ensuring that security awareness is embedded in the 
wider discursive context of the organisation and its business strategies are revealed. 
CISOs can start to overcome these issues by changing their identity to one that 
supports their activities and to do this they will need to start building their power base 
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 in the organisation and fully engage with employees. While most CISOs aim to 
achieve a balance in their approach it is clear that in so doing they often convey mixed 
messages to employees. To overcome this situation CISOs need to start consciously 
constructing discursive approaches that bring clarity to their position.  One place to 
start could be by framing their arguments in terms of ethics and corporate social 
responsibility.  
 
This paper advances the argument that an autocratic stance inhibits effective 
information security and highlights ways that this is expressed by experienced CISOs 
through their use of discourse. They need to develop an identity within the 
organisation where they are seen to help employees discuss, and make decisions 
about, information security. The emphasis should be on delegation and empowerment 
of employees with an acceptance that, as a result, mistakes and errors may occur. 
Effort should be spent on planning for recovery from such events rather than 
ineffectively implementing measures that try to prevent them occurring in the first 
place.  
 
For researchers, this paper draws upon the ‘turn to the social’ in management research 
and pulls this through into the arena of information security. In so doing it highlights 
the importance of language in understanding organisational behaviour and in 
particular its impact on human factors in information security. The next stage of the 
research will look across a range of employees in an attempt to start to bridge the gap 
in understanding between CISOs and other employees. The aim will be to facilitate 
two-way communication between CISOs and employees. The research will sketch in 
those elements of the culture in an organisation that contribute to the taken for granted 
assumptions about information security in a particular organisation.  By encouraging 
employees to discuss how they assign cause and effect for security incidents we hope 
to get closer to the core values that impact on information security.   
 
Discursive studies in information security are not common and this study 
demonstrates that discourse analysis can yield a rich understanding of information 
security problems that fall outside the usual technical sphere of the discipline.  The 
methodological approach has also aimed to build an explicit link between information 
security research and current thinking in the field of organisational change.  The use 
of a tested analytical framework from the organisational change literature 
demonstrates this link. 
 
17 
 
 References 
 
1. Adams, A. & Sasse, M.A. (1999) ‘Users are not the enemy’, Communications of 
the ACM, 42(12), pp. 40-46 
  
2. Albrechtsen, E. (2007) ‘A qualitative study of users' view on information 
security’, Computers & Security, 26, pp. 276-289  
 
3. Alvesson, M & Karreman, D. (2000) ‘Varieties of discourse: On the study of 
organisations through discourse analysis’, Human Relations, 53(9) pp. 1125-1149 
 
4. Bryman, A. (2001) Social Research Methods. 1st edn. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 
 
5. Collis, J. & Hussey, R. (2003) Business Research:  A practical guide for 
undergraduate and postgraduate students. 2nd edn. Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan 
 
6. Crouch, M. & McKenzie, H. (2006) ‘The logic of small samples in interview-
based qualitative research’, Social Science Information, Sage 45(4), pp. 483-499 
 
7. Dhillon, G. (1995) Interpreting the management of information systems security. 
PhD Thesis, London School of Economics.  
 
8. Dhillon, G., & Backhouse, J. (2001) ‘Current directions in IS security research: 
towards sociotechnical perspectives’, Information Systems Journal, Blackwell, 
11(2), pp. 127-153 
 
9. Dick, P. (2004) ‘Discourse Analysis’, in Cassell, C. & Symon, G. (eds.) Essential 
Guide to Qualitative Methods in Organisational Research, London: Sage, pp. 
203-214 
 
10. Grant, D., Michelson, G., Oswick, C. & Wailes, N. (2005) ‘Discourse and 
organisational change’, Journal of Organisational Change Management, 18(1) pp. 
6-15 
 
11. Hardy, C. (1996) ‘Understanding power:  ‘Bringing about strategic change’ 
British Journal of Management(Special Issue), 17, S3-S16 
 
12. Hardy, C., Palmer, I. & Phillips, N. (2000) ‘Discourse as a strategic resource’, 
Human Relations, 53(9), pp. 1227-1248 
 
13. Hardy, C. (2001) ‘Researching organisational discourse’, International Studies of 
Management & Organisation, 31(3), pp. 25-47  
 
14. Helokunnas, T. & Kuusisto, R. (2003) ‘Information security culture in a value 
net’, Managing Technologically Driven Organisations: The Human Side of 
Innovation and Change, IEEE, pp. 190-194.  
 
18 
 
 15. Heracleous, L. & Barrett, M. (2001) ‘Organisational change as discourse:  
communicative actions and deep structures in the context of information 
technology implementation’,  Academy of Management Journal, 44(4), pp. 755-
778 
 
16. Marshall, H. (1994) ‘Discourse analysis in an occupational context’ in Cassell, C. 
and Symon, G. (eds.) Qualitative Methods in Organisational Research:  A 
Practical Guide. London: Sage, pp. 91-106 
 
17. Oswick, C., Keenoy, T. & Grant, D. (2000) ‘Discourse, organisations and 
organizing:  Concepts, objects and subjects, ‘Human Relations’. 53(9), pp.1115-
1123 
 
18. Potter, J. & Wetherell, M. (1987) Discourse and Social Psychology:  Beyond 
Attitudes and Behaviour. London: Sage 
 
19. Saunders, M., Lewis, P. & Thornhill, A. (2007) Research Methods for Business 
Students. 4th edn. Harlow, Essex: Pearson 
 
20. Schein, E.H. (2004).  Organisational Culture and Leadership. London: John 
Wiley & Sons  
 
21. Shultz, E. (2004) Security training and awareness – fitting a square peg in a round 
hole, Computers and Security, 23 (1) pp. 1–2 
 
22. Siponen, M.T, (2001) ‘Five dimensions of information security awareness’ ACM 
SIGCAS Computers and Society, 31, pp. 24-29  
 
23. Siponen, M.T. (2000) ‘A conceptual foundation for organisational information 
security awareness’, Information Management & Computer Security, 8, pp. 31-41  
 
24. Thomson, K. & Von Solms, R. (2005)  ‘Information security obedience: a 
definition’, Computers & Security, 24(1), pp. 69-75 
 
25. Tsoukas, H. (2005) ‘Afterword: why language matters in the analysis of 
organisational change’, Journal of Organisational Change Management, 18, pp. 
96-104 
 
26. Wertsch, J. (2001) ‘The Multivoicedness of Meaning’ in Wetherell, M., Taylor, S. 
& Yates, S.J. (eds.), Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader, Oxford: OUP, 
p.222-235 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
